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Abstract: The text analyzes the economic relations between China and Latin America in the 
context of the capitalist world system. It is argued that as a world power, China has developed 
a network of economic, trade and financial relations with other economies around the core, 
the semi-periphery and periphery of the system. The analysis explains the nature of the 
structure of economic relations between China and Latin America, which is part of China’s 
periphery. The structure of the relationship between China and Latin America is a function of 
China’s development and not of its periphery. In other words, the relationship serves Chinese 
interests through the unequal relationship in which China exports manufactured goods and 
high value-added products and imports basic products and commodities from Latin America. 
To justify this unequal relationship, Beijing argues that both partners are part of the 
developing world and that the trade structure between the two parties is of mutual benefit. It is 
what we call “win-win rhetoric”. The paper argues that this explanation serves China as a 
means to hide a bilateral relationship that has a distinct North-South structure and that serves 
China’s own interests. The text further argues that the relationship between the two parties 
serves China’s interests as a world power. Thus, China has a utilitarian relationship with Latin 
America. 
 





China is the emerging global power and the only one able to challenge the US world 
hegemony in the first half of the twenty-first century. Among the strategies of hegemonic 
construction and expansion of its economy, Beijing has developed a network of economic 
relations with both the industrial economies and those constituting the semi-periphery and 
periphery of the world system. 
This article tries to explain the nature of the structure of China’s economic relations 
with the countries of Latin America, which are part of China’s economic development in 
which the discourse of international politics plays a significant role, and in which the win-win 
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rhetoric plays a central role since it is the reasoning that justifies the development and 
preservation of an asymmetric economic relationship.  
Through its foreign policy speech, the power identifies itself as a developing country 
which shares the same challenges, goals and interests as the Southern nations. This discourse 
tends to systematically praise the mutuality of interests based on common international 
principles, a similar notion of belonging to the developing world and the mutual benefits of 
economic relations. However, China’s argument hides a reality: the increasing dependence of 
Latin American countries on a structure of North-South relations, according to the capacity 
and power distribution characterized as core-periphery -as formulated by Prebisch, whose 
division element is the specialization of international work.  
 
Understanding China’s Rise to Hegemony 
From the perspective of world system (Wallerstein, 1975, 1984; Arrighi, 1985, 1998) based 
on the core-periphery morphology (Prebisch, 1949, 1951) and global change, China 
represents both change and continuity. Change because it represents a transition in the 
economic hegemony process (Li, 2014), and continuity as competition and rivalry occur in the 
context of the capitalist order.  
Under the ideology of neoliberalism, after the end of the Cold War, capitalism came to 
represent the global order (Bernal-Meza, 1991; 1994). As a paradigm of the new international 
order, “globalization” became opposed to “bipolarity” (Bernal-Meza, 2000: 33-34). This 
transition to a new stage of expansion of historical capitalism –the stage of globalization3- has 
led to the overcoming of what Cervo termed as “difficulties in the construction of a global 
order, by the late twentieth century” (Cervo, 2001). Since then, in the same way that it has 
previously been under the order dominated by Europeans, the West have shown a remarkable 
ability to “accommodate” emerging powers (Ikenberry, 2008: 31) and the same will happen 
with China, following the argument of this author. 
China has played an indispensable role in the global triumph of neoliberalism and, 
therefore, global capitalism has been strengthened in the current phase of globalization (Li 
                                                 
3 This interpretation of globalization, according to Raúl Bernal-Meza (2014: 39-40), can be 
synthesized in the formula GLOBALIZATION=PROCESS+IDEOLOGY. Steen F. 
Christensen and Raúl Bernal-Meza, “Theorizing the Rise of the Second World and the 
Changing International System”, in Li Xing (Edited by), The BRICS and Beyond. The 
International Political Economy of the Emergence of a New World Order, Ashgate, Surrey, 
United Kingdom. 
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Xing, 2010; Bernal-Meza, 2012; 2012a). However, this is a variety of capitalism (VoC), 
which shares the logic of the market economy but not the political liberalism, so liberal 
economic elements are combined with statist elements (McNally, 2014).  
 
It is important to understand that China’s choice in favour of capitalism -in a historical period 
in which the market economy would become the central feature of our time- was a strategic 
decision based on the potential of the country under a concentration of power in the hands of a 
single party, which limited the range of discussion on possible options for development, such 
as the continuity of the communist economic model.  
From this point of view, the rise and decline of powers remain in the logic of the 
international system described by Paul Kennedy (1988). Rising powers want to translate their 
newly acquired power into greater authority in the global system (Ikenberry, 2008). Having 
opted for the capitalist mode of accumulation, China has followed the principle that all States 
that have dominated the international system -or aspire to do so- have struggled to increase 
their share of wealth and power, to become both rich and strong, or to stay in that position. 
The rise of China does not represent more than that and its global behaviour is in line with 
this principle. 
While for Li Xing the most important event in the international system over the past 30 
years has been the re-emergence of China as a major regional power and its rise to the rank of 
the world’s largest economy, for Ikenberry (2008 p. 23) this rise is undoubtedly “one of the 
great dramas of the century”. In the same vein, Li Xing (2010:149) points out that China’s 
sustained economic growth over the last three decades is the biggest challenge to the 
prevailing world order since the end of the Cold War. Even if China’s growth rate slows 
down from its current pace, no other country is bound to have a similar impact on the world 
economy in the next two decades, and China will replace the United States in 2030 as the 
world’s largest economy (World Bank, 2012: 6).  
Yet the hegemonic rise of China also marks a transition in the international balance of 
the last two centuries. The old North-South axis, which used to portray the division between 
development and underdevelopment, is being replaced by an East-South axis (Pieterse, 2011). 
From Asia, China has moved from the periphery to the core (Li Xing, 2012; 2012ª), 
generating challenges and constraints (Li Minqi, 2005). In this systemic configuration of rises 
and demises in economic hegemony, China is building its own core/semi-periphery/periphery 
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structure, particularly in Southeast Asia, Africa and Latin America. While ASEAN4 countries 
provide intermediate goods, Latin America and Africa provide raw materials. The systemic 
context of a capitalist world-economy, hegemonic competition and intra capitalist rivalry 
explains China’s expansion into Latin America and Africa. The discourse of public 
diplomacy5 and China’s foreign policy towards Latin America hide a reality: the increasing 
dependence of Latin American countries on a North-South relations structure. China plays the 
“developed country” card – for instance when wielding power in NATO and UN talks– and 
the “under-developed country” card – for instance when negotiating African agreements– 
when it suits her (Stewart and Li, 2013: 28). 
 
The Impact of China’s Rise 
What are the consequences of the dynamics of consolidation and expansion of a power? The 
experience left by policies historically applied by other powers, between the sixteenth century 
and the first half of the twentieth, which proved to be efficient for the purpose of 
accumulating power and wealth, was the colonial and imperialist practice; both the United 
States from the mid-nineteenth century, and Japan, in Southeast Asia, after the Russian-
Japanese War.  
China is increasingly comparable to the old role of the United States as an 
“indispensable nation” in the world (Li Xing, 2010) and simultaneously confronts Japan and 
the Western powers within the model of capitalist accumulation. Its rapid economic growth is 
an unprecedented fact in modern and contemporary history, having reached the number one 
position in the world economy in less than 40 years: 1979-2019. In this context, China’s 
international track record shows that it is a status quo power, a conservative power that has 
used the international post World War II order and the world capitalist system for its own rise.  
Simultaneously to expanding its interests to peripheral and semi-peripheral countries, 
China started to play in world politics through cooperation with countries that have been 
called the “second world” (Christensen and Bernal-Meza, 2014) and alliances such as BRICS, 
aiming to find a place in international management under coalitions with countries that are not 
considered as their potential enemies by the West: India, Brazil and South Africa. Although 
its power is not currently represented in the structures of the Bretton Woods order, we must 
                                                 
4 Association of Southeast Asian Nations. 
5 Cf. Rodríguez and Yang Shouguo (2013). 
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think about what will happen when China consolidates what today is an emerging power; 
when China equates, equals or exceeds the United States.  
According to Oliveira (2013), Antonio Barros de Castro6 developed a concept of “post-
China”, which expressed the idea that this power of the XXI century was in a process of 
reorganization, in an innovative form of society and state, which would spread globally as a 
restructuring power. One aspect of this reorganization has been the development of a sui 
generis model of capitalism (VoC). 
As proposed, the discursive support for China’s foreign policy has been its belonging to 
the developing world. From that win-win rhetoric perspective, China misrepresents the reality 
of a relationship with Latin America that is clearly north-south, both from the perspective of 
the structure of trade, and from the military-strategic and global security point of view. This 
aspect is revealed clearly as China moves from economy to politics on its international 
agenda.  
China is a key player in the global economy because its productive model stimulates the 
growth of all other economies of the world by the creation of a virtuous circle of investment, 
production and market, which has had an impact on a global scale. The bandwagon effect also 
strengthens the economic hegemony of the tractor and creates dependence on the core engine 
from the economies on the bandwagon (Oviedo, 2014:151). This feature should be deepened 
in the future, as China is currently the axis of world economic dynamism. By 2011, the power 
already accounted for 30 % of the growth in global demand (Eichengreen et al., 2011: 8).7 As 
long as China keeps its strategy of production and export of manufactured goods, the demand 
for raw materials will not cease and that is the trend in the medium and long term.  
 
China in Latin America 
Fifteen years ago, China was an unknown economic player in Latin America, with the 
exception of Chile. Today, in 2015, China is the biggest trading partner of Chile, Brazil, 
Uruguay and Peru, and the second biggest trading partner of Argentina and Venezuela 
(Sevares, 2015; Cepal, 2015; Observatorio América Latina Asia Pacífico). 
The structure of trade between China and its productive model integrated into the world 
capitalist economy stimulates the growth of other economies by creating a virtuous circle of 
investment, production and market. However, structurally, these commercial, financial and 
                                                 
6 Brazilian economist of development thinking, who died in 2011. 
7 Quoted by Uehara (2013). 
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investment networks involving Latin America are just “functions” of Chinese development; 
that is to say, the logic that determines and sustains their respective dynamics responds to 
China’s development model, not to a model of industrial development of its Latin American 
periphery. 
China’s demand for raw materials fits in with the regional offer. This situation, though, 
has led to a primary-export specialization in Latin America. The process of trade 
primarization is a result of two mechanisms: the core-periphery bilateral matrix and the fact 
that China is replacing Latin American manufactured exports in third markets. Thus Latin 
American economies are being pulled by the dynamics of foreign trade, creating dependency 
on the driving core economies.  
The countries that had already developed import substitution industrialization (ISI) 
policies and were exporting manufactured goods (Brazil, Argentina, Mexico) underwent a 
process of re-primarization of exports as a consequence of the replacement of their exports 
with Chinese products, whereas the rest of Latin American partners, already primary 
exporters (Venezuela, Perú, Uruguay, etc.), deepened their primary-export status of a few 
products. The only exception is Chile which, although deepening its primary specialization 
because of its copper exports, also increased both the volume and the number of exports.  
As a result of this exchange, in the last two to five years, all Latin American countries 
have had a deficit in their trade with China. The exceptions are Brazil8 and Chile9, the 
countries with bilateral trade surplus.  
According to A. Ferrando,10 “China’s goal for 2024 is to reach a trade approaching US$ 
500,000 million to Latin America” (Ferrando, 2015). As the author points out, it is an unequal 
exchange because more than 90 % of regional exports are raw materials, while less than 10% 
of imports from China are commodities, and the rest are industrial products consisting of low, 
medium and high technology. 
 
 
                                                 
8 http://cebc.com.br/sites/default/files/china-brazil_update_v.final_oficial.pdf. 
9 DIRECOM, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Gobierno de Chile, “Análisis de las 
relaciones comerciales entre Chile y China en el marco del Tratado de Libre Comercio”, 
Santiago, agosto de 2015. 
http://www.direcon.gob.cl/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/AN--LISIS-RELACIONES-
COMERCIALES-CHILE-CHINA.pdf. 
10 Project Director of the Institute of International Strategy of the Chamber of Exporters of 
Republic of Argentina (CERA) and Director of the China Observatory of the same entity. 
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The Political Policy 
The rise of China in the global economic power structure has modified and influenced the 
international integration of Latin American countries. The general evolution of international 
economic relations in the region indicates that its member countries, since the beginning of 
the twenty-first century, started - to a greater or lesser extent - to refocus their economic 
relations towards China. This shift would also begin to influence their foreign policies, to the 
extent that regional countries endorsed in a pragmatic way the agenda of issues that mattered 
to China. Thus the power began to influence the foreign policies of the region (Ross, 2002a; 
Becard, 2008; Oviedo, 2010; Bernal-Meza, 2012) through the predominance of Chinese 
global political interests in the definition of the bilateral agenda. 
At the same time, its Latin American partners adopted in their international agendas 
China’s foreign policy priority issues: its recognition as a “market economy”, the “One 
China” principle and the non-questioning of the Tibet issue, the Taiwan question, the 
acceptance of China as a “developing country”, the unquestioning silence in terms of 
violations of human rights, etc. Thus Chinese global political interests have been predominant 
in the definition of the Latin American bilateral and multilateral agenda, yet there has not 
been any move in the opposite direction as there could have been with the issues of 
development cooperation, controls on financial capital that the core economies divert to 
periphery via “tax havens”, protection of their natural environments and resources, access to 
the markets of developed countries for their manufactured goods, etc.; as well as some 
historical issues on the international economic order. 
At the beginning of those 15 years, China was considered a great hope for the Latin 
American economic development. Today, it is increasingly seen as a big challenge and a big 
problem for development because China has replaced the role of the United States and the 
earlier role of Britain as a dominant economic power, which sets up the region as its 
subordinate periphery and increasingly becomes the main investment and capital exporter 
power. The diagnosis of this situation is quite common among Latin American analysts, 
academics and diplomats, including Chilean ones, because they too have started to have 
similar concerns. 11 Chinese and Latin American interests in international politics do not 
match, nor are they likely to do so in the future.  
                                                 
11 Latin American authors such as C. Ross, E. Oviedo, CJ Moneta, J. Sevares, R. Bernal- 
Meza, Altemani de Oliveira, D. Becard, D. Guelar, etc. 
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However, despite the existence of similar diagnoses, there is no common policy of Latin 
American countries to face the challenge of China, as it has been noted in recent research 
(Bernal-Meza, 2014). The trade complementarity produced by the harmony of interests 
between China and South American countries constitutes the backbone of the relationship 
between the two segments. However, this harmony is asymmetric (Oviedo, 2014: 144). Thus, 
the more dependent Latin America becomes on Chinese imports and exports of capital, the 
more compromised the region will be in the context of the overall interests of the emerging 
world power.  
Among the relevant issues for our region, as developing countries in a process of 
modernization, China -and also other BRICS, such as India and Brazil- would then be 
introduced as a variety of capitalism (Becker, 2013). That is, a model of delayed 
development; a form of state-led development, alternative to the historical path represented by 
Anglo-American and Western European capitalism. This phenomenon would become part of 
China's image, which limited the huge historical and cultural differentiation between China 
and Latin American countries, since, as in many other late developing countries, owners of 
private capital in China have substantiated the Chinese party-state with the creation of an 
alliance of political and economic elites (McNally, 2013); types of alliances that were also 
forewarned and are now present in underdeveloped capitalism in our region, particularly 
through populist governments. 
China has broken with the assumption that capitalist development should follow the 
Western tradition and has demonstrated that capitalism is not a monolithic, waterproof and 
ideologically coherent block - like the example of USA-EU-NATO would show- but rather a 
complex socio-economic system that adapts to different forms in different nations, cultures 
and times, in which the national “option” -unique and original – turns out to be part of the 
alternatives of development. In this scenario, Latin America - and particularly South America 
- is an increasingly long way from meeting American and Western European interests, thus 
the approaching China (and also Russia) emerges as options for the international integration 
of the region, which eventually will pose a challenge to American hemispheric dominance.  
China will have increasing impact and influence on the international system and vis-à-
vis Latin America, and this condition is not shared by any other Western or emerging world 
power. For Latin America countries, China’s rise will mean a redefinition of their frameworks 
of international relations as a result of the transition, and probably later, its consolidation as a 
hegemonic power.  
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China and Latin America in International Politics 
For China, the basis of international cooperation with Latin America is in the common notion 
of belonging to the “developing world”. Historically, the discourse of China’s foreign policy 
has insisted on the country’s status as such. However, this is a difficult condition to accept for 
Latin American countries since, with the exception of per capita GDP, there are no other 
parameters to identify both as “similar” (Oviedo, 2012; Bernal-Meza, 2012). However, they 
share development challenges such as energy dependence (with the exception of Brazil, 
Venezuela and Ecuador), deterioration of the environment, depletion of non-renewable 
resources and environmental pollution.  
Although there are political and diplomatic factors, economic interests have shaped the 
course of China’s relations with Latin America and Mercosur. According to Rodriguez 
(2013), these interests have a central place in the public diplomacy of China. Chinese 
objectives in the region are essentially economic, and secondarily political. However, the 
investment policy follows financial planning directed from the highest echelons of Chinese 
power and it is part of the strategy of reform and expansion of financing abroad and 
deployment of Chinese banks abroad (Sevares, 2014; Guelar, 2013). Although, as Oviedo 
(2014) points out, there is a harmony of interests, it becomes a negative factor for 
development because it deepens the primary export character of the economies of the region 
and keeps –and even aggravates – the increasing dependence of our countries on Chinese 
economic development and demand.  
According to all visions and images found in the analysed literature, in large and 
medium-sized countries of Latin America –Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Colombia, Chile 
(Bernal-Meza, 2014) – China projects three outlines: 1) a vision as a trading partner, of which 
there are different interpretations, though the perception of risk is prevailing; 2) a vision of a 
state model of development and economic and social modernization; and 3) a vision as a 
possible pillar in building a new world order, which is multipolar and not hegemonic.  
 
Economic Relations 
Trade relations between China and Latin America have gone through several stages. From a 
Chinese perspective, the first stage covers the period from the 1970s to 2005, a period in 
which the supply of agricultural commodities, and other inputs such as iron, copper or wood 
was China’s trade priority. This period was characterized by China’s high trade deficit with 
Latin America and started the new “virtuous cycle” of export trade in the region. This stage 
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allowed one to speak of a “harmony of interests”. According to Oviedo, China’s relationship 
with Argentina is a clear example of what Robert Keohane called “harmony”. It refers to “a 
situation in which actors’ policies (pursued in their own self-interests without regard to 
others) automatically facilitate the attainment of others’ objectives”.12 Thus,  
 
China stimulates Argentina’s economy and contributes to achieving the objectives 
of both parties, allowing Argentina to increase sales, while ensuring supply to 
China of strategic goods for food and energy security and inputs to produce goods 
that China “factory” exports or consumes domestically (Schujovitzky, 2015).  
 
This is the interpretation of a win-win relationship with fast growth of bilateral trade and 
growing trend in the volume of investments (Oviedo, 2012). It is the stage of the 
complementarities several authors talk about (Jian Shi Xue, 2011; Bernal-Meza, 2012). The 
second stage, starting in 2005 and extending to the present day, has been characterized by a 
geometric growth of trade volume, which in turn has been characterized by a selective and 
focused investment and mergers policy that has favoured extractive industries and energy and 
port infrastructure (Guelar, 2013:31; Sevares, 2015). South American growth became a 
function of China’s domestic demand (Castro, 2013). 
By the early XXI century, China has become the most important trading partner for 
Latin America and the Caribbean. China came to replace the position occupied by Japan 
during the preceding decades, thus keeping and deepening Asia’s presence in the region. 
Sevares (2015: 95) notes that Asia’s attraction causes realignments in the regional economic 
and political relations and deepens the difficulties for any program of regional integration, 
because Latin American trade with other regions’ countries, particularly with China, is 
increasingly more important than intraregional trade. 
Provided that the key element of the link between China and South America is the 
bilateral relationship between Brazil and the People’s Republic of China (Bernal-Meza, 2012; 
2012ªa, Castro13), the characteristics of Chinese investment in that country portray what is 
happening in other countries in the region: “90 % of Chinese investments in Brazil are 
concentrated in oil and mining” (Guelar, 2013: 140). This reality is even harder since Brazil 
has the largest and most diversified industrial structure in Latin America. The situation 
                                                 
12 Robert Keohane, “Después de la Hegemonía. Cooperación y Discordia en la Política 
Económica Mundial”, Buenos Aires, 1998.  
13 Ibid. 
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became more complex as developed countries gradually became unable to absorb most of the 
exports of China (and India), which gradually were redirected towards developing countries.  
China has re-launched and deepened the structural heterogeneity of Latin America. 
From the point of view of production structures, countries that have an international economic 
integration with an industrial component (such as Brazil, Mexico and Argentina), as well as 
those which have abandoned any industrial option (Chile) and those which have never passed 
the primary-exporting stage (such as Bolivia, Ecuador and even Venezuela); all of these have 
been incorporated into the Chinese economic cycle as primary economies. Nonetheless, the 
argument of Chinese authors reveals the existence of a positive complementarity, which 
justifies the win-win-rhetoric and would also justify the existence of a “symmetrical harmony 
of interests”.  
In 2011, Jiang Shi Xue said that there was a new trend in international economy, thanks 
to China’s role in the international economy which allowed one to expect that commodity 
prices would keep an upward trend and, at the same time, those periphery and semi-periphery 
countries would benefit from imports of Chinese manufactured goods at low prices. For those 
producing countries, that would mean very good scenarios for their economic future 
development, leading to a “harmony of interests” between China and countries specializing in 
the production of primary resources in South America (Bernal-Meza and Christensen, 2015).  
This trend should deepen if Antonio Castro’s forecasts are right (Oliveira, 2013: 60): 
that the rise of East Asia, led by China, will invert the old pro-industrialized countries order, 
in which prices of raw materials always tended to fall while prices of manufactured goods 
rise. Experience shows – refuting Prebisch’s thesis about the “deteriorating terms of trade” – 
that developing countries have exported increasingly expensive raw materials and bought 
increasingly cheaper manufactured goods.  
But Jiang Shi Xue’s thesis has proven wrong, because after the crisis of 2008, a 
permanent trend of volatility and falling prices for commodities has been predominant over 
stability of demand and -whether steady or increasing- rising prices. 
The situation is even more critical if analysed from the point of view of the productive 
structures of specialization and their connection with employment and increase in demand and 
consumption. As demonstrated by the work of Bourdet, Gullstrand and Olofsdotter (2007), 
specialization in primary production does not demand employment according to rates of 
population growth and tends to generate low consumption value markets. According to the 
authors, it can be said that comparative advantages have remained fairly stable over time. 
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Low-income countries specialize in land-intensive goods; middle-income countries in labour-
intensive products, and high-income countries are intensive in technology and capital. The 
rise in terms of economic development and income only occurs as long as countries are 
transformed into producers of human capital intensive goods, which expresses the intensive 
use of technology (Bernal-Meza, 2014a).  
The share of intra-industry trade in total trade increases with income level. Since the 
economy of any country is more diversified as income rises, and there is a greater volume of 
trade between the richest countries, bilateral trade flows become more intensive in intra-
industry trade while increasing similarity in per capita income (Bourdet, Gullstrand and 
Olofsdotter, 2007). In short, although developing countries have experienced a significant 
growth in their share of world exports in the 90s and the 2000s, it does not seem to have any 
effect on the global structure of specialization; a fact that is confirmed when evaluating the 




There are three findings that support the conclusions. The first one points out that China is the 
great new rising power with capacity to replace the hegemony -for the moment, just in the 
world economy. The second is that, as hegemonic cycles suggest, the great powers develop 
and use a network of relationships that structure a relationship of domination – subordination, 
which allows them to -or ensures that they - achieve and keep power and wealth. The third is 
that this competition and rivalry between powers currently take place under the framework of 
capitalist order. 
 
From the above findings, it can be argued that China has built a structure of international 
economic and financial relations through which, according to the model “core-periphery” of 
Prebisch, China has become the core and Latin America its periphery. 
The construction of the network of “Latin American functions of Chinese development” 
has been based on a win-win-rhetoric speech. China bases its foreign policy towards the Third 
World in general and supports its public diplomacy. The structure of China’s economic 
relations with Latin America are “Latin American features of Chinese development”; i.e. that 
structure serves the Chinese economic development and not Latin America and that China 
justifies it by using the win-win rhetoric. This rhetoric (China as a developing country having 
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“South-South” relations with Latin America) base holds its foreign policy towards the Third 
World and supports its public diplomacy. 
However, China has a purely utilitarian view on Latin America. Explaining China’s 
public diplomacy, Yun Tso Lee (2013: 83) notes that the reason for the Chinese perspective 
on Latin America “lies in obtaining resources and raw materials, especially oil, in order to 
continue feeding back its peaceful rise and regain his throne as the country of the centre of the 
world”. Obviously these are not the aims of the international agenda in Latin America which, 
since the 1970s, unanimously claimed from powers the creation of a New International 
Economic Order to make possible a true path of development. Changing economic 
hegemonies does not seem to lead to the achievement of that objective. In that sense, the idea 
of a win-win relationship is just “rhetoric”. 
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